The More You Buy, the Bigger Your Tax Break : Why the Ninth Circuit in \u3ci\u3eVoss v. Commissioner\u3c/i\u3e Erred in Interpreting the Debt Limitations of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction by Monroy, Michelle
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
10-1-2016
"The More You Buy, the Bigger Your Tax Break":
Why the Ninth Circuit in Voss v. Commissioner Erred
in Interpreting the Debt Limitations of the Home
Mortgage Interest Deduction
Michelle Monroy
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michelle Monroy, "The More You Buy, the Bigger Your Tax Break": Why the Ninth Circuit in Voss v. Commissioner Erred in Interpreting
the Debt Limitations of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 49 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 729 (2016).
 
729 
“THE MORE YOU BUY, THE BIGGER YOUR TAX 
BREAK”: WHY THE NINTH CIRCUIT IN  
VOSS V. COMMISSIONER ERRED IN 
INTERPRETING THE DEBT LIMITATIONS OF 
THE HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 
Michelle Monroy 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When the United States imposed its first income tax in 1913, all 
interest was deductible.1 After Congress passed the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986, however, only the qualified residence interest deduction 
(“mortgage interest deduction”) was retained.2 President Ronald 
Reagan declared the mortgage interest deduction beyond the reach of 
tax reformers by instructing the Department of the Treasury 
(“Treasury”) to “preserve that part of the American dream which the 
home mortgage interest deduction symbolizes.”3 
The deduction costs the federal government about $70 billion a 
year, making it one of the government’s largest federal tax 
expenditures.4 In fact, the deduction “has never ranked lower than 
third on the government’s list of costliest tax expenditure items.”5 
 
 . J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science, 
2014, California State University, Long Beach. 
 1. Rebecca N. Morrow, Billions of Tax Dollars Spent Inflating the Housing Bubble: How 
and Why the Mortgage Interest Deduction Failed, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 751, 755 
(2012); see Revenue Act of 1913, sec II. para. b, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114, 167 (“That in 
computing net income for the purpose of the normal tax there shall be allowed as deductions: 
. . . second, all interest paid within the year by a taxable person on indebtedness.”). 
 2. Morrow, supra note 1, at 755; see Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511, 
100 Stat. 2085, 2247. 
 3. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax 
Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 235 (2010) (citing Lou Cannon, 
Reagan to Keep Mortgage Tax Deduction, WASH. POST, May 11, 1984, at F1). 
 4. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Tax Expenditures, in 
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 203 (2015), http:// 
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Tax-Expenditures-FY2015.pdf; see 
David M. Schizer, Limiting Tax Expenditures, 68 TAX L. REV. 275, 284 (2015). 
 5. Ventry, supra note 3, at 235. 
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Congress uses tax expenditures to incentivize particular behavior.6 
Although the mortgage interest deduction is widely believed to 
incentivize homeownership, numerous studies have concluded that 
the deduction actually has little impact.7 Instead, the deduction 
encourages excessive borrowing and inflates housing prices.8 
Despite the significant revenue loss associated with the 
mortgage interest deduction, the deduction benefits only a small 
percentage of taxpayers.9 The mortgage interest deduction is 
available only to taxpayers who itemize their deductions.10 
Taxpayers who claim the standard deduction do not receive any 
benefit.11 In 2013, only one-third of all taxpayers itemized their 
deductions.12 The amount of the benefit favored those itemizing 
taxpayers in higher income brackets and with larger mortgages.13 In 
2012, seventy-seven percent of the benefits from the deduction went 
to homeowners with incomes above $100,000.14 Homeowners with 
less expensive homes or those who have built up equity in their 
homes do not receive any benefit because their potential deduction is 
less than the standard deduction.15 The recent Ninth Circuit opinion 
in Voss v. Commissioner16 may have widened the gap between 
taxpayers who derive benefit from the mortgage interest deduction 
and those who do not.17 
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit in Voss incorrectly 
interpreted section 163(h)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (the 
 
 6. See Morrow, supra note 1, at 817. 
 7. David Frederick, Reconciling Intentions with Outcomes: A Critical Examination of the 
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 28 AKRON TAX J. 41, 43 (2013). 
 8. See Morrow, supra note 1, at 771, 775. 
 9. Id. at 759. 
 10. Schizer, supra note 4, at 315 (“[O]nly those who itemize (instead of claiming the 
standard deduction) are eligible for tax expenditures.”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. 1304 (REV. 08-2015), 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 2013 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/13inalcr.pdf 
(Table 1.2 reports 44,330,496 total tax returns with itemized deductions, and 100,898,698 total 
tax returns with the standard deduction). 
 13. Morrow, supra note 1, at 760. 
 14. Will Fischer and Chye-Ching Huang, Mortgage Interest Deduction is Ripe for Reform, 
CTR. ON BUDGET POL’Y & PRIORITIES (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/research/mortgage 
-interest-deduction-is-ripe-for-reform; Anthony Randazzo & Dean Stansel, Mortgage Interest 
Deduction Saves Middle Class Taxpayers of $51/Month, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2013, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/12/18/mortgage-interest-deduction-saves-middle-class 
-taxpayers-all-of-51month. 
 15. Morrow, supra note 1, at 760. 
 16. 796 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 17. Id. at 1053. 
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“Code”) by interpreting the mortgage interest deduction debt 
limitations as applying per-taxpayer. Part II details the statutory 
framework of Code section 163(h)(3) (“Code Section (h)(3)”). Part 
III explores the facts of the Voss case, while Part IV highlights the 
Tax Court and Ninth Circuit courts’ reasoning. Part V addresses why 
the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the provision per-taxpayer by 
misinterpreting the statutory language and in failing to consider the 
policy implications of a per-taxpayer approach. In addition, Part V 
further details the application of the court’s reasoning in National 
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services.18 
Part VI explains why the Voss decision merits Treasury regulation 
treatment, and Part VII concludes that the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) should issue a Treasury regulation adopting the Tax Court’s 
interpretation of the Code. 
II.  STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
When calculating taxable income, deductions allowed by the 
Code—the United States’ statutory tax law—reduce the amount of a 
taxpayer’s gross income.19 Individual taxpayers may choose between 
itemized deductions and the standard deduction.20 When a taxpayer 
itemizes his or her deductions, he or she reduces taxable income by a 
series of deductions that are specifically outlined in the Code, such as 
deductions for medical expenses, charitable contributions, or state 
income taxes paid.21 When a taxpayer claims the standard deduction, 
he or she reduces taxable income by a single amount determined by 
his or her filing status.22 Usually, taxpayers will itemize deductions if 
the total amount of their itemized deductions will exceed the 
standard deduction.23 To claim the mortgage interest deduction, a 
taxpayer must itemize his or her deductions.24 
 In general, the Code disallows deductions for personal 
interest.25 Personal interest includes, but is not limited to, interest 
 
 18. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 19. I.R.C. § 63(a) (2015). 
 20. See I.R.C. § 63(b) (2012). 
 21. See Jason Summers, Should You Itemize Your Deductions? Tax Tips for Claiming 
Itemizing Deductions vs. the Standard Deduction, U.S. TAX CENTER (Jan. 22, 2015), http:// 
www.irs.com/articles/should-you-itemize-your-deductions. 
 22. Id. (A taxpayer’s filing status can be single, head of household, married filing jointly, or 
married filing separately). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. I.R.C. § 163(h)(1) (2015). 
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paid on a loan to purchase a car for personal use or interest on credit 
card charges.26 Qualified residence interest is a type of personal 
interest, but is not subject to the disallowance.27 Qualified residence 
interest refers to any interest paid or accrued on debt secured by a 
taxpayer’s qualified residence.28 
There are two types of qualified residence indebtedness: (1) 
acquisition indebtedness and (2) home equity indebtedness.29 The 
mortgage interest deduction allows taxpayers to deduct the amount 
of interest paid on both acquisition indebtedness and home equity 
indebtedness secured by a qualified residence.30  
Acquisition indebtedness refers to any debt that the taxpayer 
incurs in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving his or 
her qualified residence.31 A qualified residence includes both the 
taxpayer’s principal residence and a second residence.32 Home equity 
indebtedness denotes to any debt in excess of acquisition 
indebtedness that does not exceed the fair market value of the 
residence.33 
When a taxpayer secures a residence with a mortgage, the 
taxpayer can deduct the amount of interest paid on the mortgage. 
However, taxpayers may not be entitled to a deduction for interest 
paid on the entire principal amount of the mortgage. Taxpayers are 
limited to interest paid on $1 million of acquisition indebtedness 
($500,000 in the case of married individuals filing separately) and 
interest paid on $100,000 of home equity indebtedness ($50,000 in 
the case of married individuals filing separately).34 Therefore, 
taxpayers are limited to interest paid on $1.1 million of debt in total. 
The issue in Voss v. Commissioner was whether to apply the debt 
limitation using a per-taxpayer or per-residence approach.35 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Bruce Voss and Charles Sophy (“Taxpayers”) were, at all 
 
 26. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. 17 (10311G), TAX 
GUIDE 2015 FOR INDIVIDUALS 157 (2014). 
 27. I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (2015). 
 28. Id. § 163(h)(3)(A). 
 29. Id. § 163(h)(3)(B)–(C). 
 30. See id. § 163(h)(3). 
 31. Id. § 163(h)(3)(B). 
 32. Id. § 163(h)(4)(A). 
 33. Id. § 163(h)(3)(C). 
 34. Id. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii)–(C)(ii). 
 35. Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015). 
Fall 2016] THE MORE YOU BUY 733 
relevant times, domestic partners registered with the State of 
California.36 They co-owned two residences located in Rancho 
Mirage, California, and Beverly Hills, California, as joint tenants.37 
The Taxpayers financed the purchase of each residence with a 
mortgage secured by the residence.38 The balance of the two 
mortgages in 2006 and 2007, the years at issue, was about $2.7 
million.39 The issue in Voss was whether (a) the debt limitation 
applies per-residence, such that the Taxpayers could deduct only 
interest on a combined total of $1.1 million of debt, or (b) the debt 
limitation applies per-taxpayer, such that the Taxpayers could each 
deduct interest on $1.1 million, for a combined total of $2.2 million 
of debt.40 
In 2006 and 2007, the Taxpayers each claimed the mortgage 
interest deduction for $1.1 million of debt, or a total of $2.2 
million.41 The IRS audited the Taxpayers and issued proposed 
notices of deficiency, limiting their interest deduction to $1.1 million 
in total.42 In response, each Taxpayer filed a petition with the Tax 
Court.43 The Tax Court issued an opinion in favor of the IRS, 
holding that the debt limitation applied on a per-residence basis when 
co-owners are not married to each other.44 The Ninth Circuit took the 
case on appeal and reviewed it de novo.45 In holding that the debt 
limitation applied per-taxpayer, it reversed the Tax Court’s decision 
and remanded for further proceedings to determine the amount of 
qualified residence interest that the Taxpayers were entitled to 
deduct, and the proper amount of any remaining deficiency.46 
IV.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
A.  The Tax Court 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Voss reversed the Tax Court’s 
 
 36. Id. at 1055. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1053. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1056. 
 44. Sophy v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 204, 204 (2012). 
 45. Voss, 796 F.3d at 1057. 
 46. Id. at 1068. 
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decision in Sophy v. Commissioner.47 In Sophy, the Tax Court held 
that the limitation applied per-residence.48 In its analysis, the Tax 
Court highlighted several reasons as to why the debt limitation 
applied per-residence. First, the court looked at the statutory 
language defining “acquisition indebtedness” and “home equity 
indebtedness.”49 Next, it found that the definitions contain the phrase 
“any indebtedness,” which is not qualified by language related to an 
individual taxpayer.50 In addition, the definition of “qualified 
residence interest” contains the phrase “with respect to any qualified 
residence,” which focuses entirely on the residence, rather than the 
taxpayer.51 
The court noted that while “taxpayer” appears several times in 
the section, any reference to an individual taxpayer is absent from the 
language of the debt limitations.52 Furthermore, any reference to the 
“taxpayer” relates to the qualified residence, rather than to the 
indebtedness.53 In analyzing the language as a whole, the court found 
that the repeated emphasis on “qualified residence” supports the 
contention that the debt limitations are limited in relation to the 
qualified residence, and not in relation to an individual taxpayer.54 
Second, the court looked at the language contained in the 
parenthetical addressing married taxpayers filing separate tax 
returns.55 The parenthetical language limits each married taxpayer 
filing separately to one-half of the debt limitation, such that he or she 
cannot deduct interest on more than $1.1 million of his or her 
mortgage.56 The Taxpayers in Sophy argued that the parenthetical 
language created a “marriage penalty” that did not apply to 
unmarried co-owners.57 However, the court found it more likely that 
 
 47. Id. at 1053. 
 48. Sophy, 138 T.C. at 213. 
 49. Id. at 210. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.; Voss, 796 F.3d at 1056. 
 52. Sophy; 138 T.C. at 210; Voss, 796 F.3d at 1056; see I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) (2015) 
(“The aggregate amount treated as acquisition indebtedness for any period shall not exceed 
$1,000,000.”); id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii) (“The aggregate amount treated as home equity indebtedness 
for any period shall not exceed $100,000.”). 
 53. Sophy, 138 T.C. at 211. 
 54. Id. at 212. 
 55. Id.; see I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) (“$500,000 in the case of a married individual filing a 
separate return”); id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii) (“$50,000 in the case of a separate return by a married 
individual”). 
 56. Sophy, 138 T.C. at 212. 
 57. Id. 
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the language provided a specific allocation of the debt limitation that 
must be used by married taxpayers filing separately, implying that 
unmarried co-owners could choose how to allocate the debt 
limitations.58 Noting that nothing in the legislative history of Code 
Section (h)(3) suggested the contrary, the Tax Court concluded that 
the debt limitations applied on a per-residence basis.59 
B.  The Ninth Circuit 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Voss rejected the Tax 
Court’s interpretation of Code Section (h)(3).60 The Ninth Circuit 
explained that finding an answer from the language in Code Section 
(h)(3) “requires considerable effort” because the statute is mostly 
silent as to how the debt limitations apply to unmarried co-owners.61 
The court noted that relevant Treasury Regulation section 1.163-10T 
is also silent on the issue.62 However, the court found some textual 
guidance in the parenthetical language addressing married 
individuals filing separately.63 In particular, the court held that the 
use of the phrase “in the case of” suggests that the language in the 
parentheticals contains an exception to the general debt limitations, 
not an illustration of how the limitation should be allocated.64 
In its interpretation of the parenthetical language, the Ninth 
Circuit offered three insights.65 First, the parentheticals speak in per-
taxpayer terms because the language states that the limit is for 
“$500,000 in the case of a married individual filing a separate 
return” and “$50,000 in the case of a separate return by a married 
individual.”66 The court reasoned that if Congress had wanted to 
draft the parenthetical language in per-residence terms, it could have 
done so by stating, “in the case of a qualified residence of a married 
individual filing a separate return,” the debt limitations apply.67 
Second, the parentheticals operate in per-taxpayer terms.68 The 
parentheticals give each spouse a separate debt limitation of 
 
 58. Id. at 213. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 61. Id. at 1058. 
 62. Id. at 1058 n. 5. 
 63. Id. at 1058. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 67. Id. at 105859. 
 68. Id. at 1059. 
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$550,000, so that the two spouses are entitled to a combined $1.1 
million debt limitation.69 In other words, the $550,000 debt limit is to 
be applied per spouse.70 Because the debt limitation applies per-
taxpayer for married individuals, the court suggested that the general 
debt limitations also apply per-taxpayer.71 
Lastly, the inclusion of the parentheticals suggests that the debt 
limits apply per-taxpayer.72 The court argued that if the $1.1 million 
debt limit applied per-residence, the parenthetical language would be 
superfluous because there would be no need to provide that each 
spouse gets a $550,000 debt limit.73 However, if the debt limit is 
applied per-taxpayer, the parentheticals play a role in giving each 
spouse half of the debt limit so that the couple is subject to the same 
debt limit as that of a jointly filing couple.74 In fact, Congress has 
done so in other provisions of the Code.75 
The Ninth Circuit found the Tax Court’s argument, that the 
parentheticals acted as a specific allocation, unpersuasive because 
Congress would not prevent spouses from allocating debt limitations 
as they choose, especially since most spouses own their home as 
equal partners.76 The Ninth Circuit determined that the language 
ensures that all married couples are treated as a single taxpayer.77 In 
addition, the statute’s apparent focus on “qualified residence” was 
unpersuasive on the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning.78 The Court stated 
that any reasonable reader would understand that the statute refers to 
a taxpayer, despite the omission of the word “taxpayer.”79 
The Ninth Circuit highlighted certain difficulties in applying a 
per-residence reading.80 First, the court found that the repeated 
reference to a “taxable year” indicates that the statute should be read 
as applying a per-taxpayer approach because residences do not have 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (per spouse can also be referred to as per taxpayer). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 105960. 
 74. Id. at 1060. 
 75. Id. at 1061; see, e.g., I.R.C. § 22(c)(2)(A) (providing an initial credit of $7,500 to a 
qualifying married couple filing jointly and a credit of $3,750 in the case of a married individual 
filing a separate return). 
 76. Voss, 796 F.3d at 1060. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1062. 
 79. Id. at 1062. 
 80. Id. at 1063. 
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taxable years, only taxpayers do.81 The court reasoned that if 
Congress intended to apply the debt limits per-taxpayer, it would be 
unlikely that Congress would define qualified residence interest with 
respect to a single taxable year.82 Second, it is unclear how co-
owners with different taxable years could determine the amount of 
indebtedness for any period.83 Third, two co-owners might each have 
a separate principal residence or separate secondary residence so that 
co-owners will have to coordinate tax returns to ensure that each 
qualified residence does not exceed $1 million.84 The court 
concluded that the impracticability of applying the provisions under 
a per-residence approach suggests that Congress never intended to 
apply that approach; therefore, the statute should be read as applying 
per-taxpayer.85 
V.  ANALYSIS: THE IRS SHOULD PROMULGATE A REGULATION 
FOLLOWING THE APPROACH OF THE TAX COURT 
The Ninth Circuit erred in interpreting Code section (h)(3) as 
applying the debt limitations per-taxpayer. First, the court incorrectly 
relied on the statute’s treatment of married individuals filing separate 
tax returns. Second, it failed to take into consideration the policy 
implications of a per-taxpayer approach. Third, the section’s 
legislative history suggests that Congress intended to apply the debt 
limitations per-residence. Lastly, existing interpretative guidance 
supports the implementation of a per-residence approach. However, 
the Ninth Circuit was not required to defer to existing interpretative 
guidance on the issue. Therefore, the IRS should update Treasury 
Regulation section 1.163-10T and implement the Tax Court’s 
approach. Applying the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Brand X would 
require courts to defer to this regulation when interpreting Code 
Section (h)(3). 
A.  The Ninth Circuit Erred in Interpreting  
Code Section 163(h)(3) 
The Ninth Circuit in Voss found that Code section (h)(3) was 
silent as to whether the debt limitation of $1.1 million applied per-
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1064. 
 85. Id. 
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residence or per-taxpayer.86 As a result, it issued its own 
interpretation of the statutory language.87 However, the court erred in 
interpreting Code section (h)(3) as applying per-taxpayer. 
The Ninth Circuit placed too much emphasis on the language 
found in the parentheticals regarding married taxpayers filing 
separately.88 The court argued that the parentheticals clearly spoke 
and operated in per-taxpayer terms.89 The parentheticals give each 
separately filing spouse a separate debt limit of $500,000 for 
acquisition indebtedness and $50,000 for home equity 
indebtedness,90 so that the two spouses combined are entitled to a 
$1.1 million debt limitation.91 The Ninth Circuit argued that reading 
the parentheticals in per-residence terms would result in a debt 
limitation of $550,000 combined for married couples.92 
The parenthetical language of Code section (h)(3) clearly speaks 
in per-taxpayer terms.93 The court correctly concluded that the 
purpose of this language is “to ensure that the separately filing 
spouse don’t get double the benefit that jointly filing couples get.”94 
It reasoned that since the debt limit for married couples filing 
separately applies per taxpayer, the general debt limitations should as 
well.95 However, the general debt limitations have an entirely 
different purpose altogether: they limit the amount of interest that 
can be deducted. The parenthetical language is drafted in per-
taxpayer terms because its purpose is to avoid double benefits for 
separately filing spouses. Drafting the parenthetical language in per-
residence terms, if at all possible, would blur this purpose.  
The Ninth Circuit stated that “it is a well-established rule of 
statutory construction that courts should not interpret statutes in a 
way that renders a provision superfluous.”96 It argued that the 
parenthetical language would be superfluous if the general debt 
 
 86. Id. at 1053. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) (“$500,000 in the case of a married individual filing a 
separate return”); id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii) (“$50,000 in the case of a separate return by a married 
individual”). 
 89. Voss, 796 F.3d at 1058–59. 
 90. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii); id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii). 
 91. Voss, 796 F.3d at 1059. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii)–(C)(ii). 
 94. Voss, 796 F.3d at 1060. 
 95. Id. at 1059. 
 96. Id. (citing Chubb Customs Ins. Co. v. Space Sys., 710 F.3d 946, 966 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
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limitations are applied in per-residence terms. However, the Supreme 
Court has held that it “is appropriate to tolerate a degree of 
surplusage language rather than adopt a textually dubious 
construction that threatens to render the entire provision a nullity.”97 
The parenthetical language performs a significant function in 
clarifying how the IRS treats married couples filing separately. As 
the Ninth Circuit noted, such language, although unnecessary, aids 
the reader in understanding complex tax statutes.98 
With regard to the difficulties that may arise in applying the per-
residence approach, individual taxpayers must generally adopt the 
calendar year as their tax year.99 Therefore, situations in which two 
co-owners have different taxable years will not occur on a frequent 
basis. Moreover, situations where co-owners own a principal 
residence together, and each own separate secondary residences, are 
also not determinative of what approach to use.100 Deductions with 
respect to payments of joint obligation are to be allocated to 
whichever party is liable and makes the payment out of his or her 
own funds.101 Therefore, a taxpayer can calculate the amount of his 
or her deduction based on what was actually paid, with such 
payments affecting other co-owners own deduction calculations.  
B.  Policy Implications of a Per-Taxpayer Approach 
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning ignores the policy implications of 
a per-taxpayer approach. The amount of the benefit arising from the 
mortgage interest deduction is skewed in favor of taxpayers in higher 
income brackets and with larger mortgages.102 In other words, the 
deduction benefits taxpayers who would purchase homes with or 
without the deduction, failing to promote homeownership amongst 
those who need the deduction the most.103 Implementing a per-
 
 97. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 137 (2007) (concluding that the 
phrase “any other person” although made superfluous by the phrase “any other necessary costs,” 
serves to clarify the statutory language). 
 98. Voss, 796 F.3d at 1062 (“In all likelihood, these phrases, though technically unnecessary, 
were included simply to ease the reader’s understanding of a complex tax statute full of technical 
definitions.”). 
 99. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. 538 (15068G), 
ACCOUNTING PERIODS AND METHODS 4 (2012), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p538.pdf. 
 100. See Voss, 796 F.3d at 1064. 
 101. Jolson v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 1184, 1186 (1944) (quoting MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION, vol. 5, § 27.02 9 (1942)). 
 102. See Morrow, supra note 1, at 760. 
 103. See Ventry, supra note 3, at 264. 
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taxpayer approach would further skew the benefit in favor of 
purchasing larger mortgages because co-owners would no longer be 
limited to $1.1 million of indebtedness. 
Furthermore, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 lowered the value of 
the mortgage interest deduction due to changes it made in reducing 
marginal tax rates, which reduces the amount of the benefit.104 
Increasing the standard deduction further diminished the value of the 
deduction because it resulted in fewer taxpayers itemizing their 
deductions.105 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 
(“OBRA”) further impacted the deduction’s benefit. OBRA 
introduced the debt limitations at issue in Voss.106 The changes made 
to the mortgage interest deduction “encouraged taxpayers to move 
from house to house as the primary mortgage on the house was paid 
off or the house increased in value.”107 
Throughout the next two decades, politicians sought to increase 
homeownership rates.108 In 2005, President George W. Bush 
commissioned a tax reform panel to develop strategies for 
recognizing the importance of home ownership.109 The panel 
recommended that the benefits for home mortgage interest be 
retained as a tax credit, rather than as a deduction, as a way to 
“encourage home ownership, not big homes.”110 Despite these 
recommendations, the deduction remained “untouchable.”111 
The mortgage interest deduction is ineffective in promoting 
homeownership, “in large part, due to price capitalization.”112 Price 
capitalization occurs when the value of the subsidy created by the 
mortgage interest deduction increases the price of homes.113 The 
deduction increases the value of housing, therefore increasing the 
demand for housing.114 Although price capitalization supports the 
mortgage interest deduction’s elimination because it makes housing 
 
 104. Id. at 275. 
 105. See id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 276 (quoting C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX POLICY 143 
(Urban Inst. Press, 2d ed. 2004)). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 276–77 (quoting PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, 
SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 73 (2005)). 
 111. Id. (quoting Heidi Glenn, Tax Reform Panel’s Ideas Cause Stir in Washington, 109 TAX 
NOTES 415, 418 (2005) (quoting Rep. Katherine Harris)). 
 112. Morrow, supra note 1, at 771. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 772. 
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less affordable, it also creates a risk that home value will drop if the 
deduction is phased out.115 However, the possible negative effects of 
phasing out the deduction should not deter experts from determining 
the extent to which the mortgage interest deduction can be reformed 
to better meet taxpayer and government needs. 
The mortgage interest deduction also played a detrimental role 
in housing market crisis by promoting overinvestment in housing.116 
Real estate agents emphasized, “the more you buy, the bigger your 
tax break.”117 The Ninth Circuit, by interpreting the debt limitations 
as applying per-taxpayer, has also promoted overinvestment. Under 
the court’s reasoning, owning a home with multiple taxpayers could 
result in a virtually limitless deduction. Three co-owners could 
deduct interest on up to $3.3 million of debt. Five co-owners could 
deduct interest on up to $5.5 million of debt. Where should the 
deduction stop? 
The policy implications are the same as they were decades ago. 
The Voss decision encourages more debt because it means lower 
taxes, in turn resulting in a widening the gap between taxpayers who 
can benefit from this deduction and those who cannot.118 Following a 
per-taxpayer approach further obscures the mortgage interest 
deduction’s goal of encouraging homeownership. 
C.  Congressional Intent Supports a Per-Residence Approach 
In 1987, the OBRA amended the definition of qualified 
residence interest that is treated as deductible.119 In a congressional 
report, the Committee on the Budget of the House of Representatives 
explained that if a taxpayer’s acquisition indebtedness exceeds $1 
million, then “only the interest on a total principal amount of $1 
million of such debt is deductible as acquisition interest.”120 In other 
words, only the first $1 million of the principal is deductible as 
acquisition indebtedness. The same treatment is afforded to home 
equity indebtedness.121  
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Ventry, supra note 3, at 278 (During this time, politicians sought to increase rates of 
homeownership with various tax subsidies, including tax-free rollover of gains on home sales, 
which has since been repealed). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Cf. id. 
 119. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1033 (1987). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. 
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In Sophy, the court noted that when a statute is silent or 
ambiguous, as is the case here, the court may look at the statute’s 
legislative history in an attempt to determine congressional intent.122 
For purposes of legislative history, congressional committee reports 
are the most important source for determining legislative intent.123 If 
a court ascertains that Congress had a particular intention on the 
issue, “that intention is the law and must be given effect.”124 
Despite the importance of deferring to legislative history, the 
court in Voss failed to do so, and instead issued its own 
interpretation.125 The congressional report is clear, only $1 million of 
the total principal amount can be treated as acquisition 
indebtedness.126 For Bruce Voss and Charles Sophy, anything above 
the first $1 million of the total principal mortgage balance cannot be 
used to determine their interest deduction. 
D.  Deference Afforded to IRS Guidance on the  
Interpretation of Section 163(h)(3) 
Other IRS guidance also supports Congressional intent. The 
dissent in Voss urged the majority to defer to prior IRS guidance on 
the issue.127 In 2009, the IRS issued a Chief Counsel Advice 
memorandum (“CCA”) applying the debt limit per-residence.128 A 
CCA memorandum is legal advice issued by a national office within 
the IRS Office of Chief Counsel.129 The memorandum interprets a 
specific provision or a specific set of facts, but is not intended for 
taxpayers to rely upon.130 In the memorandum in question, two co-
owners lived in the residence as joint tenants.131 The aggregate 
amount of acquisition indebtedness on the property exceeded the $1 
 
 122. Sophy v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 204, 209 (2012). 
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 125. See Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015) (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 126. H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1033. 
 127. Voss, 796 F.3d at 1071 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 128. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2009-11-007 (Mar. 13, 2009). 
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million limitation.132 The taxpayers argued that they should be able 
to deduct interest paid on $1 million of debt each.133 The IRS 
emphasized that acquisition indebtedness is defined as “indebtedness 
incurred in acquiring a qualified residence of the taxpayer—not as 
indebtedness incurred in acquiring [a] taxpayer’s portion of a 
qualified residence.”134 Because the amount of indebtedness in its 
entirety constitutes acquisition indebtedness, the $1 million 
limitation applies to such amount in its entirety.135 
To further support this position, the IRS issued a publication 
stating that the dollar limits apply to the combined mortgages on the 
taxpayer’s main home and second home.136 In other words, the 
limitation applies to the combined balances of the mortgages. Any 
amount that exceeds the debt limit may not be used to calculate an 
interest deduction. 
Despite the dissent’s insistence, the Ninth Circuit gave the Chief 
Counsel Advice limited weight.137 In analyzing the proper level of 
deference to afford IRS guidance, the reasoning of Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council Inc.138 is pertinent to the 
discussion. The Chevron opinion held that courts have a duty to defer 
to reasonable agency interpretations when Congress is silent or 
leaves ambiguity in a statute that the agency is charged with 
administering.139 The Chevron doctrine’s first step asks courts to 
decide “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue.”140 If the court finds the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the second step requires courts to 
determine whether the agency’s answer is based on a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute.141 The issue in post-Chevron cases was 
to what statutes and agency interpretations does the Chevron 
deference apply.142 
The Court in United States v. Mead Corp.143 held that the 
 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 4. 
 134. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 135. Id. 
 136. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 26, at 153. 
 137. Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1066 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 138. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 139. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 834 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001). 
 140. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
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 143. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
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amount of deference afforded to agency pronouncements should be 
decided on an agency-by-agency basis, and that the weight given in a 
particular case will depend on “the degree of the agency’s care, its 
consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the 
persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”144 Under Mead, deciding 
whether an agency pronouncement is afforded Chevron deference 
requires an analysis of both Congressional intent to delegate 
authority to make rules carrying the force of law and the agency’s 
intent to adopt rules in the exercise of that authority.145 
The IRC authorizes the Treasury to promulgate regulations.146 
The power to promulgate regulations may be conveyed through 
several specific statutory authorizations, or through general 
authorization granted by section 7805(a) of the Code.147 The tax 
community characterizes specific authority regulations as legislative 
and general authority regulations as interpretative.148 However, both 
specific and general authority Treasury regulations legally bind 
taxpayers and the government.149 Since the Treasury’s promulgated 
regulations are legally binding, an analysis of the Mead opinion 
would indicate that Treasury regulations should be afforded Chevron 
deference.150 However, there is a lack of consensus in authority 
regarding the appropriate degree of deference to give in general 
authority regulations.151 It was not until the decision of Mayo 
Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States152 
that courts established Chevron deference controlled over general 
authority regulations.153 The same cannot be said about other 
interpretative guidance, such as Chief Counsel Advice memorandum 
or other IRS publications. 
The distinguishing feature between Treasury regulations and 
other IRS interpretations is the level of formality by which they are 
 
 144. Id. at 228 (footnotes omitted). 
 145. Id. at 22627. 
 146. Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack Of) 
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1727, 1732 (2007). 
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 148. Hickman, supra note 146, at 1761. 
 149. Id. at 1736. 
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promulgated.154 The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (“APA”) 
mandates a notice-and-comment process for Treasury regulations.155 
However, most of the interpretive guidance the Treasury and IRS 
issue is not formally promulgated through a notice-and-comment 
process.156 Interpretive guidance, such as Chief Counsel Advice 
memoranda, does not carry the same weight as regulations.157 That 
is, the Ninth Circuit was correct in refusing to give the Chief Counsel 
Advice memorandum importance in reaching a decision in Voss. 
Since the Chief Counsel Advice memorandum does very little to 
support a per-residence approach, the IRS should update and finalize 
temporary Treasury Regulation section 1.163-10T and implement the 
Tax Court’s reasoning.158 The Treasury and the IRS have followed 
an “interim-final rulemaking” approach when issuing temporary 
regulations, which fails to meet the notice-and-comment procedures 
mandated by the APA.159 As a result, the IRS should solicit post-
promulgation public comments when finalizing temporary Treasury 
Regulation section 1.163-10T, in order to ensure the validity of the 
regulation.160 
E.  The Treasury Regulation Applying the Per-Residence Approach 
Would Control over the Ninth Circuit’s Opinion 
The Brand X opinion established that an agency is entitled to 
choose a different interpretation than a court’s prior interpretation 
since the agency remains the authoritative interpreter of statutory 
language.161 The agency retains the ability to construe the statute in 
any way it determines meets congressional intent, even if a court’s 
prior interpretation would foreclose the new interpretation.162 Here, 
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congressional intent indicates that Code Section (h)(3) should be 
interpreted under a per-residence approach. 
A court’s prior interpretation of a statute can override an 
agency’s interpretation only if the relevant court decision finds the 
statute to be unambiguous.163 In United States v. Home Concrete & 
Supply,164 the court found that the Brand X opinion requires 
Chevron-style deference when “a particular statute in effect delegates 
to an agency the power to fill a gap, thereby implicitly taking from a 
court the power to void a reasonable gap-filling interpretation.”165 
The Ninth Circuit in Voss found the statute to be silent,166 and silence 
is the loudest indication that an agency is entitled to issue its own 
interpretation. In essence, Home Concrete established that the 
government may use regulations to reverse lower court decisions that 
do not satisfy Chevron’s first step analysis.167 
In light of the IRS’ position in the Sophy and Voss cases, its 
prior guidance on the issue, and congressional intent, the IRS should 
issue its own regulation adopting the Tax Court’s per-residence 
approach. The court’s reasoning in Brand X indicates that such 
regulation would supersede the Ninth Circuit’s opinion. 
F.  Why the Per-Residence Approach Merits Treasury  
Regulation Treatment 
The Code grants the Treasury authority to promulgate 
regulations.168 The Code explicitly grants the Treasury interpretive 
authority through several specific statutory authorizations.169 In 
addition, Code section 7805(a) grants general rulemaking authority 
to develop “all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of” 
the Code.170 Every year, the Treasury uses both specific and general 
rulemaking authority to adopt, modify, and remove Treasury 
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regulations interpreting the Code.171 
Because the IRS has limited resources to litigate tax cases, it 
may choose not to challenge a particular case. When a case’s holding 
adversely affects the Government’s legal position, the IRS may issue 
an Action on Decision (“AOD”) to announce whether it will follow 
the adverse decision.172 There are three possible positions that the 
IRS may take in an announcement: acquiescence, acquiescence in 
result only, or nonacquiesence.173 Acquiescence indicates that the 
IRS accepts the court’s holding and will follow the holding when 
deciding cases with the same controlling facts.174 An announcement 
of acquiescence does not indicate approval or disapproval of the 
court’s reasoning.175 Acquiescence in result only indicates the 
acceptance of the court’s holding, but demonstrates disagreement or 
concern with the court’s reasoning.176 Nonacquiesence indicates that 
the IRS does not agree with the court’s holding, and will only follow 
the decision in cases arising within the deciding circuit court’s 
jurisdiction.177 In general, the IRS tends to adhere to a given circuit 
court’s controlling precedent.178 
The IRS and the Treasury expend substantial time and resources 
in adopting regulations.179 For this reason, the IRS must decide 
whether to allocate resources to challenge a decision, or issue an 
announcement of nonacquiesence. If the IRS chooses the latter, the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding would bind only Tax Court cases that are 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The issue presented in Voss merits 
treasury regulation treatment for various reasons. 
First, Treasury regulations aim to interpret and administer the 
Code. The relevant Treasury regulation to Code section (h)(3) is 
silent on the tax treatment of unmarried co-owners, despite it being a 
common form of homeownership.180 In 2010, there were about 7.7 
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million unmarried couple households in the United States.181 
Between 2000 and 2010, the rate of unmarried partner households 
grew 41 percent, four times as fast as the overall household 
population.182 In addition, the Voss decision also affects residences 
owned by siblings or multiple family members. The current Treasury 
regulation provides the method for determining the amount of 
qualified residence interest with regard to single taxpayers and 
married taxpayers filing separate returns.183 The regulation fails to 
address the issue addressed by the Voss decision.184 In order to 
successfully interpret and administer the Code, the regulation must 
be updated to clarify the method for determining qualified residence 
interest for unmarried co-owners. 
Second, the mortgage interest deduction is one of the federal 
government’s costliest tax expenditures. As addressed in Part I, the 
mortgage interest deductions cost the Federal government $70 billion 
a year.185 Third, over several decades, experts have shown that the 
mortgage interest deduction is ineffective in furthering its policy goal 
of incentivizing homeownership. The deduction’s little to no effect 
on rate of homeownership does not justify its costs. 
In addition, policy implications indicate that a per-taxpayer 
approach would encourage excessive borrowing. If the mortgage 
interest deduction’s debt limitations are interpreted to apply per-
taxpayer, then taxpayers will be more encouraged to purchase and 
co-own more expensive homes with larger mortgages. 
Lastly, nonacquiesence would create an unfair advantage for 
homeowners within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction. As explained in 
Part V, the Voss decision allows the deduction to be skewed in favor 
of co-owners with large mortgages. When the IRS issues an 
announcement of acquiescence, the IRS indicates to taxpayers that 
the issue will no longer be litigated.186 Co-owners within the Ninth 
Circuit’s jurisdiction would be entitled to deduct interest on $2.2 
million of debt or more, while their counterparts in other 
jurisdictions would be limited to interest on $1.1 million of debt. 
Over several decades, experts have agreed that the mortgage 
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interest deduction should be phased out, and re-introduced as a credit 
to encourage homeownership among taxpayers who cannot itemize 
their deductions.187 Not only was the Tax Court’s per-residence 
approach correct, its impact on the federal government and 
U.S.taxpayers merits Treasury Regulation treatment. The deduction 
is ripe for reform due to the reasons outlined above. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit erred in interpreting Code section (h)(3) as 
applying the debt limitations per-taxpayer. The court incorrectly 
relied on the statute’s treatment of married individuals filing separate 
tax returns, therefore placing too much emphasis on the parenthetical 
language’s purpose. In addition, the court failed to place any 
importance on legislative history and IRS guidance on the issue. In 
so doing, the court’s interpretation deviated from the proper per-
residence approach. 
The Ninth Circuit court should have adopted the Tax Court’s 
interpretation of Code Section (h)(3). This interpretation is correct 
and merits regulation treatment because it avoids a tax avoidance 
shelter’s negative implications, scaling back the difference between 
those who benefit from the deduction and those who cannot. For 
these reasons, the IRS should finalize and issue a regulation adopting 
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